TTP dialogue: an unbalanced rationale

 To 'persuade' the banned Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) to come together for peace in Kabul this summer under the control of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA), notably the 'Haqqani' Group, Pakistan flew in tribal elders, Ulema, bureaucrats, and stakeholders. The discussions, which were supposed to start in October 2021, are supposedly at a standstill since TTP appears unlikely to budge from its key demand of undoing the former FATA's merger with the province of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa. Such reversal is not taking place since it would require a constitutional amendment. The TTP's insistence on maintaining its military presence in its home country despite a peace agreement has reportedly drawn the ire of Pakistani interlocutors.

On July 30, 2022, a second tribal group from Pakistan arrived in Kabul as part of the most recent effort to advance the peace negotiations. This team joined a previous Ulema delegation headed by Mufti Taqi Usmani. Ulema further urged TTP to disarm and go back to Pakistan. The agreed-upon cease-fire is still in effect, at least on paper, and Pakistan did free several TTP detainees.

 

In a meeting held behind closed doors in the PM House on June 22 of this year, military leadership briefed the Parliamentary Committee on National Security (PCNS). The main justification given by the government for discussions with the terrorist group was/is "the danger of TTP militants joining ISIS/Da'esh." This justification is as weak as they come.

TTP strikes a nerve. The attack on the APS in Peshawar, which killed innocent children just because they attended an Army school, is still vivid in people's minds. Even now, it's unsettling to remember the numerous beheadings of soldiers and security personnel throughout the years, the kidnappings for ransom, and the nihilist bombing of mosques. The terrorist group aspires to create a state within a state and does not recognize Pakistan's Constitution or laws. The TTP continues to terrorize security troops anytime the allure of phony calm makes us let our guard down.

Therefore, as stated in earlier articles, the TTP calculus is not motivated by a genuine desire for peace. The real motivations behind IEA/TTP peace overtures are Pakistan's stern warnings to the IEA of closing down TTP safe havens inside Afghan territory, airstrikes on TTP hideouts on 16 April 2021, and IEA's "impatient keenness" to get rid of this legacy issue to regain sovereign control of entire Afghanistan. In December 2021, Pakistan reportedly used a drone strike in the eastern Afghan region of Kunar to attempt to kill Faqir Mohammad, a prominent Taliban figure. TTP's return to Peochar Valley, Swat, this week may have been a "recce in force" meant to determine the "pulse" of security.

TTP is also aware that the Afghan swamp would soon dry up for them because the IEA cannot afford for ongoing use of Afghan safe havens to disturb an "indispensable" Pakistan. Like many insurgencies, TTP is approaching its "exhaustion point," or "culminating point," which could happen sooner rather than later due to tiredness, casualties, declining recruiting, and an unfavorable politico-military environment.

Because of factors such as the IEA's inexperience, the emergence of ISIS, the shame the IEA feels over the US drone murdering al-Zawahiri, etc., the IEA's assault on the TTP has caused a rift among Afghans. Furthermore, it appears that the TTP, who is Haqqanis' protégé, and the Qandahari component of the IEA do not agree on everything. During the Jihad against the US/NATO, TTP and Haqqanis maintained their alliance.

 

Therefore, for a variety of reasons, Kabul's and Islamabad's concerns that an alienated TTP or its breakaway groups could increase ISIS numbers are unfounded. One, devoted TTP cadre has eloped with Da'esh and will continue to do so regardless of the outcome of peace negotiations. For such nihilistic individuals, life is meaningless without violence. Two: In that situation, it would be operationally beneficial for IEA to focus solely on ISIS rather than keeping an eye on an unpredictable TTP cadre after appeasing the "reconcilable elements" within TTP. Three: The threat posed by ISIS is exaggerated and controllable by a joint (indirect) military activity of the IEA and Pakistan. Four: Both countries will need to deal with ISIS now or shortly, with or without the TTP hardliners. Last but not least, the IEA's standing will improve both locally and internationally with the defeat and elimination of TTP from Afghan territory, opening the road for its eventual recognition and economic salvation.

The Pakistani military, veterans, and other significant national stakeholders are likewise opposed to the TTP receiving a blanket amnesty. The process must be driven by tough talks that call upon riwaj (traditions), tribal rules, and sharia if appropriate. The "state" gives in, but only after the "citizens" submit to state authority, lay down their arms, apologies, and promise future good behavior. By doing this, as was previously said, the "black elements" that commit terrible crimes are dealt with or removed according to the established procedure. If history is any indication, it wasn't all that long ago when the British Army would exact vengeance and restitution in the same mountains whenever the Empire's rights were violated by deploying native troops. Keeping your composure is key.

A parliamentary oversight committee has been established to guarantee that any TTP demands that are unconstitutional or illegal are sidestepped due to disagreements among political parties on the expected outcomes. The process should be led and driven by the military, but the Pakistani government must have full control over it.

Pakistan, in cooperation with/with the IEA's consent, should continue to target TTP cis/trans-frontier as a means of moving forward in the "fighting and talking mode" that the TTP appears to desire. The majority of the 293 deaths caused by 153 militant assaults in the first half of 2022, according to the Pakistan Institute for Conflict and Security Studies (PICSS), were attributable to TTP. Forcefully confronting a TTP armed with advanced weapons left behind by withdrawing the US/defeated ANA troops is necessary because any other outcome will encourage some IEA factions to carry out their larger plans, if any, for the region.

The rise to power of the Afghan Taliban and its ongoing backing provide Pakistan more "positive influence" with the IEA. Hopefully, Pakistan wouldn't need to use as much "coercive leverage" as it did in the airstrikes in April. TTP's inroads into domestic territory must be completely removed, eschewing complacency. Pakistan should work with the IEA to neutralize TTP as part of a pragmatic policy assessment. One hopes there was some coordination behind the execution of TTP commanders on August 7 in Paktika province of Afghanistan, including Omar Khalid Khorasani.

Politically, it is possible to persuade Mullah Hibatullah Akhundzada, the spiritual head of the IEA, to issue a proclamation against TTP outlaws who attack a Muslim Pakistan, and abuse Afghan soil and hospitality, and disobey the IEA's pledge to the rest of the world.

 

Our "Main Effort" right now should be a coup from within.